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Abstract 
Providing ‘technical assistance/advice’ on programmes for countries under financial stress is 
well within the mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being fully part of the Troika, 
however, is a different role. Formally the ECB does not participate in the ‘decision-making’ 
on programmes (decisions are taken by the Finance Ministers – and the IMF). However, the 
ECB is part of the ‘decision-shaping’ process. These two roles have often been confused. The 
ECB should interpret its formal role in future ESM (European Stability Mechanism) 
programmes as narrowly as possible. Providing advice but avoid taking part in the 
operational work of programme surveillance. The ECB should de facto leave the Troika. 
At any rate, future incidents like the Italian or Spanish letters will be superseded by the 
OMTs (outright monetary transactions) and an Irish-type situation would be shaped by the 
legal framework of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the potential 
funding from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).  
An additional issue for the ECB is internal coherence: Its six-member Executive Board 
manages the participation in the Troika, monetary policy is decided by the Governing 
Council and banking supervision is under the Supervisory Board, separated in principle by 
Chinese walls from the (rest of the) ECB. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 The participation of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the so-called Troika of 
institutions that manage country adjustment programmes has aroused a lot of political 
controversy. It is difficult to see why an institution whose task is to ensure price stability 
for the euro area as a whole should be involved in managing a programme targeting fiscal 
adjustment and structural reforms in individual member countries. 
 It should be borne in mind that when the adjustment programmes started (for the first 
times in 2010-11) in crisis-hit countries, the entire euro area was facing deep market 
turbulence and the ECB seemed to be the only institution capable of dealing with the 
problems at hand. This is important in order to judge the role of the ECB in the country 
programmes. 
 At that moment, it seemed natural to ask the ECB to provide ‘technical assistance’ and 
‘advice’ concerning the programmes for countries that needed emergency financing. Since 
the financial stability of the entire euro area seemed at stake, it seemed to fit the mandate 
of the ECB.  
 Being fully part of the Troika is different, however, than providing technical advice. These 
two different roles have often been confused. The ECB does not participate in the formal 
decisions concerning the programmes. Decisions on conditions, financing envelopes, etc. 
are taken by the Finance Ministers (and the IMF). However, the ECB has been very much 
part of the ‘decision-shaping’.  
 During the acute phase of the euro crisis, the crucial role of the ECB might have been 
unavoidable, but in the future, the framework will be different. Incidents like the Italian 
or Spanish letters will not occur again. The Securities Markets Programme (SMP) has been 
replaced by the outright monetary transactions (OMTs), which require a European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) programme. An Irish-type situation would be managed 
within the legal framework of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and 
with potential funding from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 
 Going forward, the ECB should interpret its formal role in ESM programmes as narrowly 
as possible. It should limit itself to providing advice and avoid any involvement in the 
operational work in programme surveillance.  
 This already applies to the new programme for Greece. From now on, the ECB should 
avoid taking part in teams that discuss details of fiscal policy or the many other policy 
areas (labour markets, competition policy, etc.) covered by the conditionality of the 
programme. If this happens, in the eyes of the public, the ECB would have, de facto, left 
the Troika. 
 Of course, the ECB retains a legitimate interest in the stability of the banking system of 
every member state. In this context, it may be faced with a problem of internal coherence. 
Banking supervision is the responsibility of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 
separated in principle by Chinese walls from the (rest of the) ECB. This implies that any 
problems in this area should be left to the Supervisory Board (of the SSM), one member of 
which is also part of the Executive Board that manages the participation of the ECB in 
country programmes. 

 | 1 
Countries under Adjustment 
Programmes: What role for the ECB? 
Daniel Gros  
No. 124/December 2015 
1. Introduction 
Since 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been part of the so-called Troika of 
institutions (with the European Commission and the IMF) that has managed the adjustment 
programmes of countries that have been hit the hardest by the crisis (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Cyprus) in exchange for financial support, through different mechanisms, 
bilateral loans under the Greek loan facility, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and finally the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
In this framework the ECB has participated in the design and adoption of the programmes. 
The stated aim was to re-establish financial stability of crisis countries. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to say exactly what the extent of the involvement of the ECB has been (there is 
only anecdotal evidence, as suggested in the short literature review below). However, there 
is a widespread perception that the ECB’s role has been of crucial importance in many 
instances, even if formally its role was only to provide ‘advice’.   
Much of the complexity of the matter comes from the fact that the ECB has also acted as a 
‘quasi’ lender of last resort outside country programmes when it bought Italian and Spanish 
government bonds in 2011. Although these purchases were made under the Securities 
Markets Programme (SMP), whose official purpose was to repair the monetary transmission 
mechanisms, de facto the ECB tried to extract reforms from the countries in question in 
exchange for intervention on the bond markets. These ‘conditions’ were put in letters written 
by the President of the ECB to national governments. The letters themselves were not made 
public, but were immediately leaked to the press.  
All of this has provoked strong criticism of the ECB, which is seen as having interfered too 
much in matters of national sovereignty.  
One difficulty, which is also the reason for different views on the role of the ECB, is that, in a 
financial crisis, it is impossible to completely separate financial and fiscal matters. Moreover, 
during a crisis, decisions have to be taken on the spot, under market pressure, and with 
limited information. It is thus very difficult to second-guess the decisions taken at the time. 
The main focus of this short contribution is thus how a similar crisis might play out in the 
future. A first point that one has to keep in mind is that future banking problems will be 
resolved under a completely different framework, which includes the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF). These elements of the (still-incomplete) Banking Union will 
transform the way in which financial stability is addressed and (national) banking crisis will 
be dealt with. Under the BRRD, bail in will be mandatory and the SRF will be able to provide 
substantial financing. Moreover, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) will possess the 
required information and expertise to deal with banking problems. This already means that 
the rationale for any involvement of the ECB must change.   
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Moreover, the term ECB is often used too loosely. From the outside the ECB constitutes one 
monolithic body. But in reality there are (now) two major areas of action, i.e. monetary policy 
and banking supervision, and three separate decision-making centres within the 
conglomerate ECB: 
1. Governing Council (25 members, of which 16 are voting national central bank governors) 
2. Executive Board (6 members) 
3. Supervisory Board (25 members, of which 19 are national supervisors) 
The existence of these three separate bodies poses several problems of internal coherence for 
the ECB, as enumerated below:  
The Governing Council is in principle the supreme decision-making body. It manages 
monetary policy, but not directly the participation of ‘the ECB’ in the Troika, about which it 
is informed by the Executive Board. The Executive Board manages the participation in the 
Troika.   
The Supervisory Board (of the SSM) in principle drafts decisions related to banking 
supervision for the Governing Council. In practice, the ‘non-objection’ procedure1 ensures 
that decision-making on banking supervision belongs to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
The SSM did not exist at the time the country programmes were designed and implemented. 
The latest Greek programme is the only exception. In future ESM programmes, there will no 
longer be the pressing need to involve the ECB (or, rather, its Executive Board) in detailed 
programme design and assessment. 
In this respect the future is likely to be very different from the past. The Irish approach 
(namely to save banks by increasing public debt) is unlikely to return in this form. Similarly 
for the Italian and Spanish case. Given that the SMP has been superseded by the Outright 
Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme, there will be no reason for the ECB to send a letter 
to the Prime Minister of Italy (or any other country) with a checklist of reforms to be 
approved before a certain deadline in order for the central bank to continue buying 
government securities.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
(scarce) literature on the role of the ECB in adjustment programmes. Section 3 looks briefly at 
the Irish case as an example of how different (and more difficult) the situation was in 2011. 
Section 4 then analyses the institutional framework for ‘the ECB’ in country adjustment 
programmes (discussing also briefly the implications for the current Greek programme). 
Section 5 concludes.     
2. Literature  
While the ECB was formally not part of the decision-making of the adjustment programmes, 
it has been reported to have played a crucial role, not only through policy advice but also for 
reasons associated with the fact that it had provided very large amounts of liquidity to the 
                                                   
1 As of January 2015, the Governing Council’s responsibilities include, inter alia, the following; “in the 
context of the ECB’s new responsibilities related to banking supervision, to adopt decisions relating to 
the general framework under which supervisory decisions are taken, and to adopt the complete draft 
decisions proposed by the Supervisory Board under the non-objection procedure 
(www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html). 
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banking sector, modified eligibility standards for collateral and bought sovereign bonds of 
countries under financial pressure.  
There may be an argument that the ECB had a lot at stake at that moment, ranging from the 
possible financial destabilisation of the entire euro area to the risk of incurring losses on 
controversial purchases of sovereign bonds and on large liquidity provisions. In that context, 
potential conflicts of interests could have materialised.  
This being said, a fully fledge assessment of the ECB’s participation and its degree of 
involvement in the various programmes is a very challenging task – even ex-post. On the one 
hand, it is impossible to say how markets would have reacted to different decisions, and on 
the other hand, due to the lack of reporting on meetings and decisions, it is impossible to 
assess the role played by each of the institutions within the Troika.  
The only possible assessment is one based on anecdotal evidence.  
Merler, Pisani_Ferry and Wolf (2012) have collected anecdotal evidence pointing to the fact 
that the ECB’s function in the programme missions in Greece, Portugal and Ireland was 
mostly limited to the financial and fiscal areas and did not extend to the identification of the 
financing needs. It appears that the position of the ECB on the fiscal side was typically 
strong, and supportive of larger fiscal adjustment than warranted by the European 
Commission or the IMF. On the financial and banking side, it repeatedly supported a 
strengthening of banks’ capital base, urged larger packages for banks, larger funds to protect 
depositors and argued against involuntary debt restructuring of unguaranteed bonds.  
As regards the emergence of potential conflicts of interest, it must be recalled that the ECB 
had to act under very difficult circumstance, involving important trade-offs, and overall, 
there is a widespread perception that the ECB’s role has been of crucial importance in many 
instances, even if it formally was only to provide ‘advice’. Merler et al. (2012) conclude that 
there is no clear evidence of such conflict of interest. However, they note, similarly to 
Whelan (2012), that while the advantages of having the institution in charge of monetary and 
financial stability participating in the programme are clear, the rationale for it is not.  
In particular, Whelan (2012) is critical of the double role played by the ECB, both as a policy 
maker and as policy advisor to governments in the context of conditional financial assistance 
received. He argues that being part of the design and monitoring of the programme 
implementation while not being an official provider of financial assistance confuses the 
public about the conditionality of the programme and raises concerns of legitimacy.  
Overall, Whelan admits that Irish fundamentals in 2010 required a bailout and recognises 
that the assessment of the ECB in this direction turned out to be correct. Nonetheless he 
argues that over time the ECB has been building an “embarrassing” track record in pushing 
governments to request bail-out. Irish officials reported pressures to request a bail-out plan, 
and some believe the ECB threatened that the liquidity support to banks would be 
withdrawn otherwise.  
Similarly, the (in)famous letter sent to the governments of Italy and Spain by the President of 
the ECB containing reference to “necessary policy actions” seem to reflect an awkward 
involvement of the ECB in national politics and fiscal affairs, and can be interpreted as an 
attempt to extract reforms, possibly designed in the context of a bailout programme.  
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3. Fiscal Implications of Financial Stability:  
The Case of Ireland as a Prime Example 
The ECB had to resort to many ‘unconventional’ policy measures after the start of the global 
financial crisis in 2008. In the initial phase of the crisis, its policy actions were clearly 
addressed to the euro-area financial system as whole. However, this changed when the 
financial crisis mutated into the euro crisis and nationally differentiated risk premia arose, 
and some governments started to lose access to market financing. 
At that point, the ECB faced a fundamental problem: it was trying to conduct a monetary 
policy for the entire area while financial markets were separated along national lines, which 
made policy ineffective. The ECB thus argued that the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism was broken in several countries and that this was a legitimate concern. There 
was a valid reason why the ECB had to be involved in individual countries, although its 
mandate concerned the euro area as whole. But the key difficulty in judging the role of the 
ECB during such turbulent times is that sometimes the indirect (or unintended) impact of 
decisions can be much more important than the direct one. 
The Irish case illustrates this point very well. A total amount of €64 billion was injected into 
the Irish banks. The Government borrowed €12 billion, another €21 billion came from the 
National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) and an additional €31 billion came in the form of 
Promissory Notes (PNs). This would have given Ireland a world-record budget deficit of 
more than 30% of GDP in 2010. However, the impact on both deficit and debt was less than 
the total cost of the bailout because the €21 billion of the recapitalisation that came from 
NPRF were in fact not borrowed and hence were not included.2 
The debates about the decision to fully pay out unsecured bondholders of Irish banks 
usually focus on the amount that the Irish government would have saved if this had not been 
done. This amount has been estimated at around €3-4 billion by the ECB,3 which is not 
insignificant relative to the Irish economy (about 2% of GDP) and total Irish public debt (the 
percentage is somewhat lower since public debt exceed annual GDP in Ireland). But by itself, 
the expenditure saved would not have decisively changed the outlook for Irish debt 
sustainability. Moreover, since part of the debt was held by Irish entities, including Irish 
pension funds, the burden of a ‘private-sector involvement’ (PSI) would have fallen, at least 
partially, on Irish citizens anyway. 
At that time, the legal procedure to be followed in order to contemplate action vis-á-vis 
bond-holders would have been somewhat difficult as the framework for restructuring failing 
banks and bailing-in bond-holders had not been developed yet (the BRRD came only years 
later). A formal bankruptcy might have been required to achieve any PSI. But even apart 
from the legal uncertainties, it remains difficult to provide a definite judgment on this 
episode because effects on market confidence can never be anticipated with accuracy. 
The ECB continues to argue that bailing in the senior unsecured bondholders would have 
undermined investor confidence in the Irish government and further aggravated financial 
market tensions throughout the entire euro area (and possibly beyond). Even with the 
benefit of hindsight, there is no way one can determine the validity of these arguments with 
any precision. 
                                                   
2 See McArdle (2012) for a comprehensive assessment of the matter. 
3 See McArdle (2012, p.13). 
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One available option at that time could have been to use collective action clauses and try to 
achieve a ‘voluntary’ private-sector contribution in the form of a restructuring of these 
bonds, including perhaps a small partial haircut and a substantial extension of maturities. 
But it is a matter of judgment whether the impact of such an approach on financial markets 
would have been so severe that in the end the Irish government would have been worse off. 
One has to defer to the ECB as the key institution responsible for financial stability. 
In this perspective, the issue that should have been raised at the time is whether it was 
appropriate to ask the Irish government to assume the burden of safeguarding the stability 
of the euro-area financial system. To the extent that the ‘advice’ of the ECB not to bail in 
senior bond-holders was based on concerns for the stability of the entire euro area, one 
should have found a way to compensate the Irish government for its contribution. 
Such a problem should not arise again in the future since the SRF would provide the 
financing for a restructuring, thereby avoiding a formal bankruptcy. In principle a bail-in of 
senior bond-holders would be decided under the BRRD only on the basis of the losses 
incurred and the capital required to create a viable new bank.  
4. The Role of the ECB in Countries under Programmes 
4.1 The Past  
The legal basis for the involvement of the ECB in adjustment programmes has changed 
slightly over time, from the first Greek Loan Facility, the EFSF and finally the ESM. 
However, the legal texts are vague and leave room for interpretation. The current legal 
framework is given by the ESM Treaty which calls upon the ESM Board of Governors “to 
give a mandate to the European Commission to negotiate, in liaison with the ECB, the 
economic policy conditionality attached to each financial assistance, in accordance with 
Article 13(3)”. 4 
The key expression here is “in liaison with”, which can be interpreted in a broad fashion. The 
central practical aspect, which made the ECB part of the Troika, was its participation in 
missions to programme countries. ECB staff participated apparently in most meetings, even 
if the subject matter was far removed from the ECB’s core (and exclusive) competence, 
namely monetary policy and financial stability.   
The justification given by the ECB is usually that price stability depends also on financial 
stability and that tough labour market and other reforms are necessary to regain investor 
confidence. However, this is clearly ‘mission creep’. All economic policy actions might have 
some influence on investor confidence or some indirect impact on price stability.  
It is of course possible to argue that the details of Greek labour laws, or the regulation on taxi 
drivers in Athens, have an impact on the success of the Greek adjustment programme and 
thus on the stability of the euro-area’s financial system and thus finally on price stability. But 
if one follows this line of argument to its extreme, no policy domain lies outside the purview 
of the ECB. 
The combination of ‘mission creep’ and the choice to decline responsibility for decisions is 
apparent in the reply of the ECB to the European Parliament: 
                                                   
4 http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/ESM%20Treaty.htm?lang=-en 
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The advice provided by the troika (including on reform priorities) aims at achieving 
healthy public finances, financial stability, competitiveness and sound economic policies 
and thereby at creating the conditions for sustainable growth and job creation in the 
programme countries. Decisions on granting the financial assistance, the economic 
policy conditions attached to the assistance and quarterly disbursements are taken by 
the ECOFIN Council under the EFSM Regulation, by the EWG/guarantor Member 
States under the EFSF Agreement and by the ESM Board of Governors under the ESM 
Treaty.5 
The key issue is thus that publicly the ECB has been very much part of the process, 
appearing to have the same footing as the other members of the Troika. The very term, 
troika, already suggests that its three members have equal influence and that the consent of 
the ECB was sought for all major decisions.  
Today the ECB argues that it only gave ‘advice’ and that Finance Ministers took all the 
decisions, but during the time the programmes were running, the ECB has seldom 
emphasized this aspect in public. Members in the Governing Council were usually careful to 
use the term advice in describing the activities of the ECB, but the overall impression they 
were giving was that the ECB played a full part in the process and had developed views on 
all aspects of the overall programme design. 
4.2  The Future 
The legal framework for the involvement of the ECB in the programmes has been fixed in the 
ESM Treaty, but the future will be different from the past as already mentioned above. The 
Italian and Spanish-type letters to national authorities will no longer have any justification. 
The OMT requires an ESM programme (on which the ECB will provide ‘advice’). The 
Ireland-type banking problems will also play out differently, as shown above (this also 
applies, of course, mutatis mutandis to the cases of Spain, Portugal and Cyprus). 
But going forward, the problem of internal decision-making, and hence accountability, will 
become even more important.  
The term ECB is often used too loosely. When a country is under financial distress, there are 
many areas and situations in which the ECB can be called upon to act.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, these can belong to the two main areas of action of the bank, 
namely monetary policy and supervision of banks. While in principle the two are separated, 
in practice there are decisions that can influence both (e.g. collateral policy and ELA) and 
such decisions are taken within different bodies. 
There are (now) three separate decision-making centres within the ‘conglomerate’ ECB: 
1. Governing Council (25 members, of which 16 are voting national central bank 
governors, theoretically the supreme decision-making body) 
2. Executive Board (6 members) 
3. Supervisory Board (25 members, of which 19 are national supervisors) 
 
                                                   
5 See www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140110_ecb_response_troika_questionnaireen.pdf 
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Figure 1. ECB potential involvement in countries under financial stress 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
The existence of these three separate bodies poses a problem of internal coherence for the 
ECB. The Governing Council is in principle the supreme decision-making body. It manages 
monetary policy, but not the participation of ‘the ECB’ in the Troika, about which it is only 
informed by the Executive Board. The Executive Board manages the participation in the ESM 
programmes.   
The Supervisory Board (of the SSM) in principle only drafts decisions for the Governing 
Council. But in practice the ‘non-objection’ procedure ensures that the de facto decision-
making body on banking supervision belongs to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
The SSM did not exist at the time the country programmes were designed and implemented. 
Furthermore various parts of the ECB will participate in the decision-making and shaping of 
the Single Resolution Board. The ECB (presumably meaning the Executive Board) has to be 
invited as an observer to executive sessions of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the 
national supervisory bodies, which have a vote on decisions concerning banks located in 
their country, are also part of the Supervisory Board of the SSM. 
Given this highly complex set-up, it would be very difficult to hold ‘the ECB’ accountable for 
its involvement in country programmes (unless it restricts itself to giving advice). 
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Box 1. The role of the ECB in the third Greek adjustment programme 
The current Greek programme is the first (and the only one) to take place under the new 
institutional framework (but not the BRRD). The role of the ‘ECB’ must be interpreted with care 
since the SSM is part of the ECB ‘holding’ but it is operationally separate following the 
construction of Chinese walls. 
In Greece, the BRRD with its mandatory bailing-in provisions will apply only from January 2016. 
But application of the BRRD appears inopportune in this case since the bailing-in provisions 
would hit non-insured deposits, which are mostly the working capital of small- and medium-
sized enterprises. 
In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the 
ECB, prepared the assessment of the Greek request for stability support in the form of an ESM 
loan. It foresees that the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, will have the following 
tasks:  
“a) to assess the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its 
Member States;  
b) to assess, together with the International Monetary Fund, whether public debt is sustainable; 
and  
c) to assess the actual or potential financing needs of Greece”6 
In the document, the reference to the role of the ECB, and its different functions, relates mostly to 
the assessment of the existence of a risk to the financial stability of Greece. In particular it 
contains reference to the role played by the Supervisory Board in the framework of the Asset 
Quality Review (AQR), the actions taken in relation to the ELA, such as its ceiling and the haircut 
on collateral for ELA, and lastly to the existence of the OMT as a tool to safeguard stability. 
The Memorandum of Understanding7 contains no specific mention of either the ECB or the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. 
 
5. Conclusions 
It is not new that monetary policy decisions may have a fiscal element. However, at the time 
the Maastricht Treaty was written and ratified, it was assumed that the fiscal implications of 
monetary policy would be diffuse and of second-order importance. This changed with the 
financial crisis, forcing the ECB into a delicate position. There is little point in judging the 
ECB’s actions on specific cases, like Ireland, with the benefit of hindsight. 
In terms of future ESM programmes, the ECB should limit itself to providing general advice, 
refrain from going into the details of the programme and should not participate in missions 
to national capitals. One has to keep in mind that the ECB has three decision-making bodies. 
The Executive Board has managed the participation in the Troika on its own. The Governing 
Council, theoretically the supreme body of the ECB, has only be informed ex post. Moreover, 
                                                   
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/documents/2015-07-10_greece_art 
__13_eligibility_assessment_esm_en.pdf 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/pdf/01_mou_201508 
11_en.pdf 
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the SSM, which if formally part of the ECB, will at any rate most probably be involved in any 
future ESM programme, as also will the SRB, with funding provided by the SRF.  
Given that the ECB is an independent institution, it can in principle exercise broad discretion 
(within its mandate) in its decisions. But it might be well advised to follow the example of 
the Federal Reserve, which usually abstains from commenting on the general economic 
policy of the US government. The independence of the ECB is formally much stronger than 
that of Federal Reserve. Moreover, the ECB does not face one unified political actor, but 
many different national governments whose opinions are often at odds with one another, 
thus providing another, de facto, layer of protection of its independence. But the ECB was 
granted its full independence so that it could make its monetary-policy decisions without 
political interference. 
The single task (price stability) combined with clear decision-making provide the conditions 
for the accountability of the ECB. With ambiguous tasks (and responsibilities) and 
multifaceted involvement in adjustment programmes, it becomes difficult to hold the ECB 
accountable in this respect. This provides another reason why the ECB should limit its future 
involvement to giving advice.  
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PSI Private Sector Involvement 
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